Kyocera TASKalfa 3500i - Cautions when handling consumables

TASKalfa 3500i, TASKalfa 4500i, TASKalfa 5500i
Data Security Kit (E) Overseas Version Security Target
© 2011 KYOCERA MITA Corporation
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requirements are shown below.
Table 6.2 Correspondences between security objectives and TOE security
functional requirements
Type
Security Objectives
TOE Security
Functional Requirements
O.OVERWRITE O.ENCRYPT
FCS_CKM.1
X
FCS_COP.1
X
TOE
Security
Functional
Requirements
FDP_RIP.1
X
“Table 6.2 Correspondences between security objectives and TOE security
functional requirements” rationale is described below.
O.OVERWRITE
It is ensured that any previous information content of a resource is made
unavailable upon the deallocation of the resource from the image data file stored
in the HDD in accordance with FDP_RIP.1 Subset residual information protection.
Therefore O.OVERWRITE can ensure that the residue data shall not be reused.
O.ENCRYPT
It can be ensured that the image data stored in the HDD is encrypted in
accordance with FCS_COP.1 cryptographic operation policy. To accomplish
FCS_COP.1, it is ensured that a cryptographic key enabling encryption is generated
according to FCS_CKM.1. At this time, the cryptographic key is generated every
time power is turned on, using the Kyocera Mita’s standard cryptographic key
generation algorithm.
Therefore O.ENCRYPT can ensure that the stored data shall not be illegally
decoded.
6.3.2. Dependent Relations between TOE Security Functional Requirements
The dependent relations between the TOE security functional requirements are
shown below.