Xerox  Multi-Function Device Security Target 
 
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 2013 Xerox Corporation. All rights reserved. 
ADV_FSP.2 Security-enforcing functional specification 
AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance 
AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures 
ALC_CMC.2 Use of a CM system 
ALC_CMS.2 Parts of the TOE CM coverage 
ALC_DEL.1 Delivery procedures 
ALC_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation (augmentation of 
EAL2) 
ASE: Security Target 
evaluation 
ASE_CCL.1 Conformance claims 
ASE_ECD.1 Extended components definition 
ASE_INT.1 ST introduction 
ASE_OBJ.2 Security objectives 
ASE_REQ.2 Derived security requirements 
ASE_SPD.1 Security problem definition 
ASE_TSS.1 TOE summary specification 
ATE_COV.1 Evidence of coverage 
ATE_FUN.1 Functional testing 
ATE_IND.2 Independent testing – sample 
AVA: Vulnerability 
assessment 
AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis 
6.6.  Rationale for Security 
Functional Requirements 
Table 29 and Table 30 below demonstrate the completeness and sufficiency 
of  SFRs  that  fulfill  the  objectives  of  the  TOE. These  tables  contain  the 
original rationale from IEEE Std. 2600.2-2009.  Rationales for the SFRs that 
have been added to this Security Target, that do not originate in IEEE Std. 
2600.2-2009, have been added to these tables.  Bold typeface items provide 
principal (P) fulfillment of the objectives, and normal typeface items provide 
supporting (S) fulfillment.