Testing
Leuze electronic MLC 510 41
Check: Yes No not ap-
plicable
Are safety sensor, connection cables, connectors, protection caps and
command devices undamaged and without any sign of manipulation?
Does the safety sensor satisfy the required safety level (PL, SIL, cate-
gory)?
Are both safety-related switching outputs (OSSDs) integrated in the
downstream machine control acc. to the required safety category?
Are switching elements that are controlled by the safety sensor moni-
tored according to the required safety level (PL, SIL, category) (e.g.,
contactors through EDM)?
Are all points of operation near the safety sensor accessible only
through the protective field of the safety sensor?
Are the necessary additional protective devices in the immediate sur-
roundings (e.g., safety guard) properly mounted and secured against
tampering?
If it is possible to be present undetected between the safety sensor and
point of operation: is an assigned start/restart interlock functional?
Is the command device for unlocking the start/restart interlock mounted
in such a way that it cannot be reached from within the danger zone
and so that the complete danger zone can be seen from the installation
location?
Has the maximum stopping time of the machine been measured and
documented?
Is the required safety distance maintained?
Does interruption with a test object intended for this purpose cause the
dangerous movement(s) to stop?
Is the safety sensor effective during the entire dangerous move-
ment(s)?
Is the safety sensor effective in all relevant operating modes of the ma-
chine?
Is start-up of dangerous movements reliably prevented if an active light
beam or the protective field is interrupted with a test object intended for
this purpose?
Was the sensor detection capacity successfully tested (see chapter
9.3.1 "Checklist – periodically by the operator")?
Were distances to reflective surfaces taken into account during config-
uration and no reflection bypasses subsequently detected?
Are notices for regular testing of the safety sensor legible to the opera-
tor and are they located in a highly visible location?
Are changes to the safety function (e.g. SPG, blanking, protective field
switchover) not easy to achieve through tampering?
Are settings that could result in an unsafe state possible only by means
of key, password or tool?
Are there incentives that pose stimulus for tampering?
Were the operators instructed prior to starting work?
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