Testing
Leuze electronic RSL 430 93
Tab.11.1: Checklist for integrator – to be performed prior to the initial start-up and following modifications
Check: Yes No n.a.
not ap-
plicable
Is the safety sensor operated acc. to the specific environmental conditions that
are to be maintained (see chapter 15 "Technical data")?
Is the safety sensor correctly aligned and are all fastening screws and connec-
tors secure?
Are safety sensor, connection cables, connectors, protection caps and com-
mand devices undamaged and without any sign of manipulation?
Does the safety sensor satisfy the required safety level (PL, SIL, category)?
Are the safety-related switching outputs (OSSDs) integrated in the downstream
machine control acc. to the required safety category?
Are switching elements that are controlled by the safety sensor monitored ac-
cording to the required safety level (PL, SIL, category) (e.g., contactors through
EDM)?
Are all points of operation near the safety sensor accessible only through the
protective field of the safety sensor?
Are the necessary additional protective devices in the immediate surroundings
(e.g., safety guard) properly mounted and secured against tampering?
If it is possible to be present undetected between the safety sensor and point
of operation: is an assigned start/restart interlock functional?
Is the command device for unlocking the start/restart interlock mounted in such
a way that it cannot be reached from within the danger zone and so that the
complete danger zone can be seen from the installation location?
Has the maximum stopping time of the machine been measured and docu-
mented?
Is the required safety distance maintained?
Does interruption with a test object intended for this purpose cause the danger-
ous movement(s) to stop?
Is the safety sensor effective during the entire dangerous movement(s)?
Is the safety sensor effective in all relevant operating modes of the machine?
Is start-up of dangerous movements reliably prevented if the protective field is
interrupted with a test object intended for this purpose?
Was the sensor detection capacity successfully tested (see chapter 11.3.1
"Checklist – periodically by the operator")?
Were distances to reflective surfaces taken into account during configuration
and no reflection bypasses subsequently detected?
Are notices for regular testing of the safety sensor legible to the operator and
are they located in a highly visible location?
Are changes to the safety function (e.g. protective field changeover) not easy
to achieve through tampering?
Are settings that could result in an unsafe state possible only by means of key,
password or tool?
Are there incentives that pose stimulus for tampering?
Were the operators instructed prior to starting work?